At block number 10,499,401, which anticipated to be mined next Thursday. The Ethereum experiment network Ropsten will go through a backward-irreconcilable improve dubbed “London.”
This is the first of three test network releases for London in the lead-up to a primary network activation. It is not definitely programmed by Ethereum developers for mid-July. It contained in London are five code changes, also called “Ethereum Improvement Proposals” (EIPs). Ethereum Foundation’s Tim Beiko said:
“[EIP 1559] introduces changes to the block header, adds a new transaction type, comes with new JSON RPC endpoints. And changes the behavior clients in several areas (mining, transaction pool, etc.). We highly recommend that projects familiarize themselves with the EIP.”
In addition to that, out of the five EIPs in London, EIP 1559 is probably the most predicted and disputed code change of them all. EIP 1559 presents a minimum payment. We also call it a “base fee,” for sending transactions on Ethereum that dynamically regulates based on network activity and request for block space.
Whereas EIP 1559 first offered in 2019, past two years, there were many misapprehensions about its usage. And also strike on end users, miners and investors.
In the following paragraphs we will talk about 4 common myths about EIP 1559.
Myth 1: EIP 1559 goaled at reducing high fees on Ethereum
At its nucleus, the goal of EIP 1559 is to decrease the transaction fees less changeable and more probable by creating an algorithmic model to spontaneously modify costs by a factor of 1.125x at most per block.
Under the present blind auction-like system for specifying fees on Ethereum. The costs for sending a transaction can skyrocket at a moment’s information depending on the ups and downs of the crypto markets.
Moreover, under EIP 1559, fees gets regulated to raise and fall based on the use of block space. If blocks filled above a set “gas target,” the base fee will raise by 12.5% and vice versa.
These changes to the internal workings of Ethereum’s fee model doesn’t have anticipation to decrease transaction fees on Ethereum, however. The matter of high fees is mainly because of limited network capacity to process transactions. EIP 15559 on its own won’t have an effect on how many transactions the network is able to handle at once.
Myth 2: EIP 1559 will create Ethereum’s monetary policy more anticipated
EIP 1559 presents a fee-burning mechanism that will completely remove coins from the total circulating provide of ether (ETH, -4.61%) (ETH).
The reason for burning the lowest fee rather than distributing them to Ethereum miners is to make certain that there is no financial motivation for miners to artificially crowd the network and keep the base fee high.
Due to of this burning mechanism, EIP 1559 may make stronger a bitcoin-like narrative of narrow supply to the investment case for ether.
It is hard, but, to anticipate quietly how much ether will be burnt over the time. The base fee dynamically regulates according to network activity and request for block space.
While EIP 1559 presents a equilibrium against an ever-growing ether supply. It doesn’t make Ethereum’s long-term monetary policy more permanent. On the other hand, it presents economic uncertainty to the network by making it impossible to control what the total supply of ether will be over time.
Myth 3: It is presumably that EIP 1559 will cause Ethereum miners to leave and attack the network.
we calculated that miners will lose 20% to 35% of their income with the activation of EIP 1559. And so there are some petitions from mining entities on Ethereum to stop EIP 1559. In its current form from being accepted into the London upgrade.
Moreover, corrections to EIP 1559 have been offered. Those contains changing the offers so that the base fee won’t burn. Growing miner income from other sources such as block subsidies and making regulations to Ethereum’s mining algorithm. So that rivalry for network rewards among miners is more fair.
In spite of the resistance from members of the Ethereum mining community. We expect EIP 1559 to be released on Ethereum’s main network in July. Which grow the question that whether miners could potentially resist the London upgrade. They do it by shutting down their machines and weakening the security of the network.
As that is possible, there are a several of reasons that why it is unseemly that the main number of miners will defect or try to damage Ethereum as a result of EIP 1559 activation. One of the main reasons is that miners should decline rewards they might have. Apart from that earned by upgrading their machines and continuing operations.
There is also the fact that miners have a little runway on Ethereum and will have to decline 100% of rewards once the network switches to a proof-of-stake (PoS) agreement protocol early next year.
Myth 4: EIP 1559 will solve the problem of miner extractable value (MEV) on Ethereum.
Miner have income on Ethereum historically contains of a fixed block subsidy and transaction fees. But, as a result of the increasing reputation for high-frequency trading on decentralized exchanges (DEXs). Miner income from MEV became more and more profitable. Investigation and development organization Flashbots calculates daily income from MEV grow from half a million dollars at the start of this year to over $6 million in June.
As background, MEV is the income that miners can gain as a direct result of their capability to order transactions within a block. It is hard to quantify because miner income made from reordering, can come anytime a user interacts with another user or application on Ethereum.
EIP 1559 decreases the capability for miners to depend on transaction fees as a way to have MEV from users. However, the capability for miners to order transactions and as a result of that earn MEV through other means will stay unchanged under EIP 1559.
Talking to the continued need for study and expansion of MEV after EIP 1559 activation, Flashbots researcher Philip Daian said during a virtual Ethereum conference in May:
“The transaction fees people are paying for inclusion [in a block] are actually a very small percentage of the eventual MEV market … The game is still fundamentally unchanged and the deeper protocol level mitigations are still things that we haven’t explored yet.”